Tagged: science

A Conversation Between Two Philosophers: On Abortion, Persons and Value

My purpose here is to respond to a post published by Steven Dunn over at Philosophic Augustine. I met Steven several years ago in conversations on Tumblr. Over the years, he has maintained a resolute interest in philosophy, which is something I greatly admire about him. Few things remain constant over several years, so the fact that he has retained his passion for philosophy is impressive. He’s also grown a lot with respect to his knowledge and that’s to be applauded.

Prior to reproducing our discussion hitherto, I want to be clear about what I’ll be looking to accomplish in this response: a) address his latest response that features Aristotelian personalism and metaphysics b) circle back around to Bill Vallicella’s argument. I think it’s important not to lose sight of the argument, especially given that that’s the reason I commented on Steven’s Facebook post to begin with. I will make it clear that even if one granted the undeniable personhood of a fetus, it still would not follow that an abortion is equivalent to murder. With that said, here is the discussion as it stands; my reply to Steven’s latest response will follow.

Steven Dunn: Philosopher Bill Vallicella over at his blog Maverick Philosopher considers a brief but important argument:

(a) Abortion is murder.
(b) Abortion ought to be illegal.

The question: Can one consistently hold (a) and not (b)? Suppose an added proposition:

(a) Abortion is murder.
(b) Abortion ought to be illegal.
(c) Murder is illegal.

I posted this argument on my personal Facebook page which wrought the response of one of my old friends from the Tumblr blogosphere, R. N. Carmona. Carmona is a philosophic tour de force, one of whom I’m familiar with conversing and debating since I was 17 in 2013 (now I’m 24).

There was a lot of heated exchanges between me and Carmona. After learning of his upcoming book, Ending the Abortion Debate, I knew that this issue was something he was well-versed in and felt passionate about. The following exchange doesn’t do full justice to Carmona’s overall position, but the highlights I’m sure are as he would see fit. Enjoy!

R. N. Carmona: (a) is unsound, hence making the whole argument unsound. Aborting an embryo or non-viable fetus simply is NOT murder. Most abortions happen before week 16, with a majority of them happening before week 9. At no point in those times does a fetus resemble an infant and more importantly, the hallmarks of a person aren’t present yet. That happens at around week 22, hence the hard cut off in most states at 20 weeks. Specifically, EEG waves register in the neocortex at around week 22 and the neocortex isn’t full developed till around week 36. I’d argue that it’s murder after week 22.

The only time I make exceptions after that many weeks is if there’s a threat on the mother’s life, but if the choice is between the quality of life of a mom and her family and a nine week old fetus, it’s an easy choice. Keeping abortion legal prior to week 20 reduces maternal mortality, which, if you’re pro-life, you should care about. Moreover, restrictive policies increase infant and maternal mortality. We’ve had lots of tries at the conservative Christian way: Northern Island, the Muslim World, the Philippines, etc. Restrictive policies do not work.

This is precisely what my next book is about. Want to end abortion? Get behind the issue. Address poverty, lack of education, lack of access to contraception, domestic violence, etc. That’s the only way to slow the rate of abortion. Restricting it won’t work and those conservative states that have passed heartbeat bills are about to find out the hard way.

Steven Dunn: There is actually a large extent in which I agree with you. I’ve read a lot of your writing on this issue and I appreciate you’ve pointed the dangerous restrictive policies that do currently exist. There is also an importance as you say in addressing poverty, lack of education, etc.

However, my initial problem began when you claimed that aborting an embryo or non-viable fetus is not murder. Even though non-viable fetuses have no chance of survival, that still does not warrant moral permissibility to end its life. I don’t see where the line of moral difference changes with an embryo, fetus, or fully grown human infant. Is it a spatial difference? Is it a temporal difference? Does the week, day, or trimester matter when ending the life of a *potential human?

Of course, we could have a metaphysically more significant conversation than the kinds of questions I’m asking you. I just think that these questions are a good starting point. Also, what is the “hallmarks of a person”?

R. N. Carmona: The hallmark of a person is quite simply, the consciousness attributed to human beings and higher order animals like dolphins and the great apes: neuroplasticity, memory acquisition, language capacity, etc. Even simpler than that, the capacity to apprehend taste, texture, sound, and so on. Even them who are mentally disabled, assuming they aren’t blind or deaf, can have these experiences. The blind and deaf, though lacking an important sense, still have propensities for memory acquisition, language, and so on.

And that’s the difference: spatio-temporal. Of space, because the potential person now occupies a uterus, taking nutrients from the would-be mother; of time because the potential person is currently not in the world, i.e. is not a citizen of a given country; is not protected by laws.

Potential simply is not enough. The fetus is potentially stillborn or potentially going to die of SIDs or will potentially be an ectopic pregnancy or will potentially be born to become a serial killer that will make Ted Bundy blush. You can’t speak of potential as though it’s solely and predictably positive; potential can be very negative. In fact, this child can be the reason the mother dies and leaves behind a husband to raise several kids, including the newborn, on his own. Potential simply isn’t enough to obligate a woman to continue a pregnancy she’d rather terminate.

So yes, the week matters because so long as a fetus isn’t viable, abortion should be permissible. The moral difference changes once the fetus is viable. Potentiality simply isn’t a good argument. Viability is a much stronger argument.

Furthermore, the moral difference changes when purposeful modification comes into play. Sure, an infant doesn’t have that capacity: it doesn’t, for example, set goals for itself. However, the parents, once they are told that the fetus is developing well, start to purposely modify on the fetus’ behalf: they start thinking of a name, buying clothing, setting up its room, putting money in its college fund, etc.

No parent, even if they’re a Christian conservative, begins to purposely modify at conception or even in the early weeks. It’s simply not enough to go on and tells you that, behaviorally speaking, most parents write off potential. Potential isn’t enough for anyone to go on and that’s why most people need something concrete before they begin to purposely modify on their baby’s behalf.

So yes, there’s a simple line to draw between a non-viable fetus and a viable one. I can speak of organismality as well, namely comparing and contrasting between organisms to come to a good conclusion regarding what a non-viable fetus most closely resembles, and it’s clear that they don’t resemble a newborn. There are marked differences, but I digress.

Steven Dunn: I would clarify that you are *technically correct in saying that potentiality is not enough. A potential X of course is not an X. Because I am a potential speaker of the French language doesn’t mean I can speak the French language. However, potentialities are still nonetheless grounded in being: they are realities not merely possibilities.
They are actual human beings with various potentials.

Though they are not realized among differing spatial and temporal locations/positions, I don’t think you’ve provided a meaningful account of persons. Human persons, as I see it, are instances of personalized being; persons possess phenomenological qualities that make them eligible for relationships – or interpersonal love. I think our definitions of persons should capture something specific (and simple), rather than be a construct of various qualifiers (neuroplasticity, apprehension of the senses, etc).

One biological example worth mentioning that I think you’ll appreciate is the cognitive capacity of bonobos – which is one of my favorite areas of primatology to examine their analogous behavior with humans. They’re sympathetic, they can experience pain, they are highly intelligent, they can have an extensive non-verbal vocabulary, etc.
Despite these striking qualities, they do not fit under the definition of persons I’ve provided above.

What does it mean to be a real person? A couple things: (i) what W. Norris Clark has called the “participation structure of the universe”; rational-intelligibility that allows for human persons and the universe to find meaningful relations/predictions; (ii) existence as a dynamic act of presence and (iii) action as a [self] manifestation of inner-being.

I think your definition of persons is merely conditional; it’s dynamic but not exhaustive. Human beings – that is, if a personalized being possesses such potentialities – are intrinsically valuable; there can be no moral difference among this being’s spatial or temporal location.

In summary. . . I think you are raising issues that aren’t typically addressed by conservatives. It’s important that we better handle areas of women’s reproductive healthcare, which can be dealt with through better and intentional education, personal conviction, etc. However, I think we need to agree that the moral question is not somehow addressed because we’ve raised current social or political problems surrounding abortion. There are consequences and symptoms that need to be taken care of, by all means. However, if structurally we are dealing with the intentional ending of a human life then we need to talk about it.

R. N. Carmona: I disagree there. What I hear is Aristotelian language here and I reject his metaphysics all the way through. Potentialities are not realities grounded in being. I think even Aristotle makes a distinction between potentiality and actuality, and as I recall, he doesn’t conflate them in this manner.

Persons do, however, possess phenomenological qualities, like phenomenal consciousness, but that isn’t what makes them eligible for relationships and interpersonal love. What’s needed there is simple empathy and bonobos and chimps, in general, are capable of that; that’s one reason why some advanced nations recognize them as persons. So rather than a construct of qualifiers, it’s more a recognition of qualifiers taken together to get a basic definition of person.

The base anthropocentrism of theists doesn’t allow them to accept that other higher order animals are persons, and that’s what you’re doing here. Dolphins call each other by name and remember individuals for decades. Elephants can also remember individuals after years of not seeing them. So while there’s certainly a distinction between a human person and a dolphin person, there is overlap that qualifies them both and that overlap is found in the sciences. The issue here is that your definition relies less on science and more so on an implied belief in the soul or on metaphysics rather than science.

I agree with (I) as it’s pretty much purposeful modification paraphrased. (II) relies heavily on Aristotelian metaphysics and I reject it outright. (III) stems from two, but alludes to libertarian action of will, which I don’t think anyone has. There’s no [self] without the [other] and other is much more crucial in action, especially willful. I think human persons can change course, but only after realizing enough deterministic conditions underlying their actions, thus empowering them to experience determinants that may lead to an overall change of course.

Think of the proverbial alcoholic; he doesn’t willfully change his bad habit, but what he does is “change” a given number of determinants so that his actions may change and out of a recognition that if he doesn’t make these changes, he is pretty much enabled: a) stops associating with friends who drink regularly b) doesn’t go to bars when invited c) goes to rehab. And so on and so on and so on.

Action itself isn’t in a vacuum, but dynamic and intertwined with the flux of all there is. So human potential takes course in a deterministic manner and any human looking to have any semblance of control over that will reposition herself with respect to determinants. A fetus is incapable of this sort of purposeful modification, which I think is the most actualized of all.

So my definition, while not alluding to souls or anything religious, is also sufficient because it recognizes the role of the other in the shaping of the self. The embryo and non-viable fetus do not interact with the other in the manner in which persons do and it is simply potentiality and not actuality, to use your language. What is commonly aborted is (what can be) rather than (what is), so that spatio-temporal difference lays the groundwork for a moral difference and the moral difference lies in purposeful modification which I think your (I) paraphrases.

Any metaphysic that doesn’t account for the other, even something as arbitrary as a chair, isn’t complete. Hegel understood this and is the forefather, I think, of modern metaphysics, starting in the phenomenologists that soon followed him. Hurssel relied a lot on Aristotle too and I’m not alone in seeing that he was mistaken for doing so, but again, I digress.

Steven Dunn: I would respond to your outlook on Aristotelian personalism as not fully appreciating what the system has to offer. In our personal conversations on abortion I have mentioned to you that yes, personalism and the potentiality principle has largely been carried and grounded in Catholic moral theology. I understand, therefore, we both don’t share views in the inspiration of Christian theology.

Hence, we need to find anthropological and philosophical commonalities in which we can meaningfully proceed in a discourse about human persons and what exactly is developing in the womb. The best system that does this, in my view, is Aristotle’s conception of being from his Metaphysics and the further extension from Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of persons (with some modifications).

Aquinas argued that persons are that which is “perfected in all of nature.” This essentially means that persons are not merely special “modes” of being amongst others, but that personhood is being when it is allowed  to be at its fullest. In other words, persons are not restricted by sub-intelligent matter. There are a number of reasons why persons – humans – possess the special status that they do, and while I think there are theological reasons for this I think I can still demonstrate that apart from any inspired or “revealed” source.

First, Aquinas’ notion of person was conscious of the distinction between person and nature, because providing a consistent account of personhood meant that a consideration of God as Triune (one divine nature amongst three persons) and Christ as the God-man (divine person possessing two natures) needed to be contextually consistent.

Therefore, it has been an accusation by some leading Catholic philosophers (Wojtyla, Ratzinger, Clarke, etc) that Aquinas falls short of a comprehensive philosophical definition of person because the medievals relied primarily on the Boethian definition of person: “An individual substance of a rational nature.” Hence, I would argue for a further inclusion of the concept of “relation,” which is fundamental to our understanding of what it means “to be.”

Aquinas moved away from the what has been called “self-diffusiveness” of the Good as seen by the NeoPlatonists (the collaboration of the Good with all “substances”) and instead moves to Supreme Being, where Existence (esse) – as I said before – now becomes the root of all perfection. Supreme Being is the subsistent Act of Existence, where now the self-diffusive Good now becomes self-communicative Love.

Hence we have three primary qualities for the relationability of persons: being is (1) self-communicative (showing that persons are intelligible [ratio] by their actuality); (2) being is self-manifesting (persons are immediately relatable to other beings); and (3) being is intrinsically active (persons are not merely present but actively present).

Suppose a being for example that existed in reality but didn’t or couldn’t manifest itself to other beings, or if it didn’t or couldn’t act in any way. If this kind of being lacked such properties then other beings couldn’t have knowledge of its existence; it would be almost as if it had no being at all. Now imagine if all beings existed in this sort of way; the universe itself wouldn’t be connected in the unified sense that philosophers and scientists typically speak of the rationality of the universe.

Now combine this with the potentiality principle. According to Current Anthropology (2013), potentiality is a principle not so foreign to them: potentiality “denotes a hidden force determined to manifest itself – something that with or without intervention has its future built into it.”1

Let me be clear that potentiality is the only relevant metaphysical principle worth considering for abortion. My position, to be clear, is not:

  1. X is a creature of a certain sort.
  2. Creatures of this sort have right R.
  3. Therefore, X has a right R.

Premise 2 of course begs the question in favor of what I want to prove. In summary, my position is that the full and perfect realization of being is always inherent in its nature. All living things, including mindless plants, dolphins and gorillas have a proper end or “good” which is naturally directed within their nature – even from a formless or potential state. Nothing can exist without potentials, and potentials cannot be realized apart from something actual.

Now the metaphysical picture I’ve provided is not mere conjecture but is what historically has served as the foundation of Western intelligentsia for over 1,500 years, until the advent of the modern model by Descartes and Newton. And I would argue that that move away from the model of classical metaphysics has been one of the greatest errors and blunders of Western thought. It was an illegitimate move because it’s not as if new physical discoveries were made, hence “outdating” the Aristotelian system.

Descartes, among other French intellectuals at his time were responsible for the shift away from potential/actual, the four causes, and his metaphysic of being. Bad move.

R.N. Carmona: While not mere conjecture and arguably the foundation of Western intellgentsia for over 1,500 years, one would have to gloss over important bits of history to make that argument. One of the more significant bits of history I have in mind is the Christian and Muslim censorship and destruction of texts that were not in agreement with monotheism, especially works that were of a more naturalistic flavor. Carlo Rovelli puts it succinctly:

I often think that the loss of the works of Democritus in their entirety is the greatest intellectual tragedy to ensue from the collapse of the old classical civilization…We have been left with all of Aristotle, by way of which Western thought reconstructed itself, and nothing of Democritus. Perhaps if all the works of Democritus had survived, and nothing of Aristotle’s, the intellectual history of our civilization would have been better … But centuries dominated by monotheism have not permitted the survival of Democritus’s naturalism. The closure of the ancient schools such as those of Athens and Alexandria, and the destruction of all the texts not in accordance with Christian ideas was vast and systematic, at the time of the brutal antipagan repression following from the edicts of Emperor Theodisius, which in 390-391 declared that Christianity was to be the only and obligatory religion of the empire. Plato and Aristotle, pagans who believed in the immortality of the soul or in the existence of a Prime Mover, could be tolerated by a triumphant Christianity. Not Democritus.2

It’s not a mere coincidence that Aristotelian metaphysics stood in fashion for so long, nor was it established that the Aristotelian system was better than other systems. In that same time period, theists, especially Christians, held a virtual monopoly on ideas and as such, metaphysical frameworks with more naturalistic bents were destroyed or censored. Due to this, there was a reluctance on the part of skeptics and naturalists to offer a naturalistic metaphysical system. They were rightfully afraid of The Inquisition. So, Aristotelian metaphysics didn’t dominate the landscape because it was the best framework, but rather, because the game was rigged in its favor.

Copernicus and Galileo, for instance, dealt with the consequences of challenging theistic thought. Copernicus’ De revolutionibus “was forbidden by the Congregation of the Index ‘until corrected’, and in 1620 these corrections were indicated. Nine sentences, by which the heliocentric system was represented as certain, had to be either omitted or changed.”3 Galileo’s house arrest is a well-known historical fact and there’s no need to tread over old coals here. More to the point, “Bruno [was]…much more of a philosopher than a scientist. He felt that a physicist’s field of study was the tangible universe, so he challenged any line of thought that utilized nonphysical elements and avoided what he considered the juvenile exercise of calculation. To him, computational astronomy missed the true significance of the sky.”4 Bruno held to eight purportedly heretical theses and they served as the reason for his execution. Among these theses were patently naturalistic positions: the universe is spatially infinite, there are other planets very similar to ours, there were humans before Adam and Eve, the Earth moves in accordance with Copernican theory.5  In all but one of these positions, Bruno has been proven correct. So the notion that Aristotle’s system is best overall or, at the very least with respect to defining personhood, is already disputable because as has been demonstrated, competing, especially naturalistic, frameworks were discouraged. Despite this, before I set out on my own exploration with regards to what best explains potentiality, I will challenge Aristotle’s personalism.

Even if I were to grant that Aristotle offered much in the way of explaining personhood, there’s still the question of how any of these criteria apply to embryos and early fetuses. Take for instance, (1) self-communicative (showing that persons are intelligible [ratio] by their actuality). To my mind, embryos and early fetuses are not self-communicative nor intelligible, and that’s because they have yet to develop the organ that makes this possible, namely the brain. Now, while I recognize that Aristotle offers an interesting conundrum worth considering, i.e., as you put it, “Nothing can exist without potentials, and potentials cannot be realized apart from something actual,” I don’t see that a fetus’ obvious intelligibility and self-communication follows. As we will see shortly, there’s a better explanation for the notion that nothing can exist without potentials and that no potentials can be realized separate from something actual.

In like manner, let’s consider also (2) being is self-manifesting (persons are immediately relatable to other beings). On the assumption that Aristotle was correct, I don’t see how embryos and early fetuses are self-manifesting and immediately relatable to other beings. If anything, it is only relatable to its parents and siblings, assuming they had children already. Since it has not emerged independently within the world, it is not relatable to other people, the ecosystem in its locale, nor the wider biosphere. The fact that it isn’t independently within the world makes so that it isn’t relatable to any other beings. Furthermore, it’s relation to its parents and siblings is best explained and anticipated by genetics, which we will get to shortly.

Let’s also consider (3) being is intrinsically active (persons are not merely present but actively present). Again, embryos and early fetuses are not present, let alone actively present for the same reasons they aren’t self-manifesting. The fact that it is not independently within the world, once again, proves problematic for the third criterion. I can grant that it is actively present once born, for its parent(s) is now self-modifying on its behalf. It is interacting with other persons in a very obvious manner and relies on them for its physical, emotional, and psychological growth, growth that is crucial for its potential to eventually become a person who has a theory of mind, a sense of self, an ego, memories, desires, goals, and so on. Within the womb, that simply is not the case early in any pregnancy. The woman’s voice and music can help with brain development starting at 29-33 weeks. So harkening back to what I said earlier, interpersonal interaction is only possible when the brain is sufficiently developed, which strongly favors the thesis that the brain is integral to a human person rather than a soul.

Now to the matter of what better explains the predictable potential of a human fetus, after which three conclusions should be immediately clear: either 1) that we do not require a metaphysical explanation for potentiality and personhood or 2) that given genetics and evolution, what’s necessary is a metaphysical framework that is congruous with and readily predicts scientific facts and 3) that nothing can exist without potentials and that potentials are not realized without actuals has been solved.

One of the primary reasons I reject Christian theism as a worldview is because it gives human beings an undue “special status” all while ignoring human evolution. Human potential or more specifically, homo sapien potential wouldn’t exist without an ancestor’s (probably homo antecessor) potential. Furthermore, homo sapien potential would not have been realized without the actuality of ancestors and likewise, without the divergence of ancestors, great apes would not have progressed as they have. As you well know, we share about 98.5% DNA with chimpanzees and some 96% with gorillas, two facts that establish a common ancestry. So this “special status” is actually an example of special pleading because it’s not at all clear why chimps and gorillas do not qualify for such status; also, neanderthals, given what we currently know about them, are in many respects like homo sapiens (a fact that made their interbreeding possible) and as such, would qualify for such status without question. Yet on Christian theism, no human ancestor qualifies for this status, an attitude I find very suspicious.

Human evolution, like evolution in toto, has an underlying genetic component that explains these variations in populations over time. That same genetic component continues among all populations of species and thus, better explains “the perfect realization of being…inherent in the nature of mindless plants, dolphins, and gorillas.” Furthermore, potentiality does not denote a “hidden force determined to manifest itself,” but a rather statistically predictable pattern present in the genome of an organism; it isn’t hidden at all, but rather in plain sight. The pattern is so predictable that one can readily explain how and why that which is formless becomes something with form.

So prior to circling back to Vallicella’s argument, I will offer a brief overview showing how the actuality of parents results in the potentiality and probable actuality of a child. It is also important to note that given genetics, there are a number of factors that determine morphological sex, eye color, hair color, skin tone, and so on. So let’s imagine that in universe A, Jack and Jill have a baby girl named Janice and that in universe B, they have a boy named Jake. Let’s consider the important differences in each child, differences that explain why Janice exists in A and Jake in B.

In universe A, Jack and Jill are both 24-years-old when they agree to having a child. Jack and Jill are wealthy and have spent the last four years of their relationship traveling. Neither of them are stressed and have no trouble being happy and grateful for all that they have. When considering that high stress increases the probability of having a boy, it is no surprise that Jill gives birth to Janice nine months later. Yet that still does not explain why Janice has brown eyes (though both her parents have blue eyes), her mother’s hair color, and her father’s hitchhiker thumb. In the main, had another sperm fertilized the egg, Janice very likely would have been born with completely different features. Despite low stress levels, there’s also the fact that Jack has five sisters and no brothers, therefore increasing the probability of having a girl. This still does not explain why Janice has brown rather than blue eyes, blonde rather than brown hair, and a hitchhiker thumb rather than a straight thumb.

Allelic combination is important in explaining her phenotypic features. Should both parents pass on recessive genes, Janice is born with a hitchhiker thumb. Or alternatively, if there’s a combination of dominant and recessive genes, she may have a chance to have a hitchhiker thumb or a straight thumb. If there’s a combination of dominant genes, then she will predictably have a straight thumb (see reference). Eye color tends to be similar, albeit more complicated.

For instance, the assumption is that since Janice’s parents have blue eyes, she will also have blue eyes. There are two genes integral to determine eye pigmentation: OCA2 and HERC2. An active HERC2 activates OCA2, which determines pigment; given this, we know that this is what explains Janice’s brown eyes. Her counterpart in universe B, Jake, has either a broken HERC2 or a broken OCA2 and therefore, has blue eyes (see reference). He also has brown hair and a straight thumb. He has a straight thumb because instead of a recessive and dominant gene (what we find in Janice’s genome), we find two dominant genes in Jake’s genome. Their disparate hair colors are also explained in this manner as well. It is also likely that in Universe B, Jill gave birth to Jake because of the high levels of stress she experienced during pregnancy. Jack and Jill decided to conceive at the ages of 31. During the pregnancy, they moved from Middletown, NY to New York City because they both wanted more job opportunities. The crowded commutes, her career, the noise pollution, among other things, stressed Jill out to no end and this increased the probability of having a boy, hence (probably) the birth of Jake.

Form, likewise, follows suit. Drosophila have been important in research in evolutionary biology and genetics. In observing curious mutations in these flies, geneticists discovered homeotic genes that determine the body pattern of all organisms. The research gets very technical and makes for quite the tangent, but homeotic, or Hox genes themselves come from a Hox-like ancestor that explains the similarities Hox genes have from organism to organism (see reference). The graphic makes the extrapolations of their research clear.

Hox Evolution

What is also clear is that the following turns out to be false: “All living things, including mindless plants, dolphins and gorillas have a proper end or “good” which is naturally directed within their nature – even from a formless or potential state.” It’s not so much that there’s a natural tendency even from a formless, potential state, but rather, that there’s an evolutionary and genetic history that informs how a comparatively formless embryo develops into a human being. There are also traits that are arbitrary as there’s no purpose as to why someone would have brown rather than blue eyes or a hitchhiker thumb rather than a straight thumb. Some traits are inconsequential with respect to who a given person is.

Aristotelian metaphysics is considered outmoded by contemporary philosophers and scientists because it is incongruous with various scientific paradigms. Setting cosmology and physics aside, as I think I’ve shown, Aristotle’s concept of a person is incongruous with evolution and genetics and the system did nothing in the way of anticipating the advent of evolutionary biology and genetics. His system speaks of personhood in a patently non-naturalistic or even supernatural manner whereas genetics and evolution show that personhood is linked to certain types of purely physical organisms. What is required is either no metaphysical framework at all (à la logical positivists) or a framework that coincides with modern philosophical and scientific paradigms. Aristotle’s system doesn’t accomplish that and far from a “bad move,” Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and everyone who eventually stood on their shoulders have every justification to move away from the Aristotelian system. Although interesting, that potentials can’t exist apart from actuals is explained by genetics for that which is animate and memetics for that which is inanimate. In fact, Aristotle was closer to correct with regards to universals and particulars, an explanation that can be applied to inanimate objects rather than living entities. Yet despite the potential for a human embryo to become an actual human person, a roughly predictable, naturalistic set of occurrences take place before every human birth. The process is also a fragile one as an injury to the would-be mother can end the pregnancy; genetic anomalies and an implantation anywhere other than the uterus can make it so that this potentiality never results in an actuality. Aristotle’s system also doesn’t explain the fragility of this process not just in humans, but in other organisms as well. It should therefore be clear that conclusions aforementioned have been firmly established and that if metaphysics remains a concern for philosophers, we have to do better than what Aristotle and his disciples rendered us.

Now to circle all the way back to Vallicella’s argument. Even if one were to grant the undeniable personhood of a fetus, either through the medium of Aristotelian metaphysics or another metaphysical framework altogether, there’s still the issue that the intentional killing of this person doesn’t constitute a murder. The pivotal error pro-choicers make is that they tend to define abortion and ignore what it’s being equated to. They should also consider the legal definition of murder, since Vallicella is alluding to the legal rather than the moral definition.

The killing of an embryo or fetus is done with intentions and motives altogether different from those underlying homicide, and as such, from a legal standpoint, it can’t be approached as murder or even a lesser offense like manslaughter. There is no degree of murder applicable to abortion; the intention and motive are not the same either, so even from a legal perspective, abortion is not murder. It would constitute an intentional killing of a different sort, of an even benevolent sort. Therefore, a woman who has an abortion can’t be tried and convicted as a murderer, neither can the doctor who performed the abortion. Let’s consider first degree murder. Premeditation is already an issue for Vallicella’s argument; the prosecution wouldn’t be able to argue that the mother had a malicious intent to kill this person. As for second degree, even though lacking the premeditation criterion, implies a reckless disregard for human life. The prosecution can’t accuse a woman of that either.

What’s more is that, if you were right in that a fetus is a person despite its viability, then restrictive policies would be the only choice we’d have. Like Vallicella’s argument implies, murder is treated in an extremely restrictive manner; even self-defense has to be established with no room for doubt. So if abortion were murder, it would be dealt with in like manner. So setting metaphysics and ethics aside, from a practical point of view, we should be wary of equating abortion with murder because we have dealt with the latter in a restrictive manner and we should know better, especially given the deadly consequences of such policies. So even if for solely practical reasons, we should shy from such equivalence even if it could be proven that abortion is murder. The issue here is that no pro-lifer has qualified that statement in any manner that doesn’t make for a bare assertion. Abortion is simply not murder and to think of women who have abortions as murderers is to misunderstand this issue altogether. What we should be addressing are the common motivations for seeking an abortion: poverty, domestic violence, lack of employment opportunity, and so on. I can go on, but I’ve probably overstayed my welcome as it is, so for the time being, I will leave this here.

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The featured image to this article was taken from https://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/explore/collection/work/4291/

The featured image to this article is Rembrandt’s Two Old Men Disputing (1628).

Cited Sources:

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What is Post-Theism?

By R.N. Carmona

Many might be confused by the post-theist label. It does not mean that one is a theist unaffiliated with organized religion. This doesn’t mean one believes in a deity. Post-theism describes an attitude that one is beyond the god question. The atheist label no longer makes sense because the question of god is a settled fact; a god doesn’t exist and never did, so one doesn’t lack belief, but rather proceeds with the knowledge that there’s no god and conducts their life as such.

One no longer dwells on the question or considers the question. Yes, this is compatible with gnostic atheism because it requires knowledge rather than mere non-belief sans knowledge, i.e., agnostic atheism. However, the question of whether a god exists no longer interests the post-theist; it no longer occupies her time in that it’s something she gives no thought to. Religion and belief in god is a relic of human history. So she is as post-atheistic as she is post-theistic.

Post-(a)theism is a stronger position in that it isn’t a proclamation of non-belief or even knowledge of there being no god. It’s a stronger claim: religion was borne out of human ignorance; our lack of scientific knowledge, historical knowledge, philosophical understanding and reasoning, and technological progress resulted in a belief stemming from agency over-detection, among other fallacious conclusions. Religion was the result of primitive thinking, underdeveloped reasoning, and a severe misapprehension of the world we live in.

In many ways we are all post-theistic in that we don’t attribute lightning, tidal waves, strong winds, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes to the wrath of a god. We moved passed polytheistic explanations of natural phenomena and remain only with the palpably silly idea that a god created the universe and world. The post-theist gets to a point where those notions are as ridiculous as the idea that Zeus launches every lightning bolt everywhere – including on planets like Jupiter. If one is to learn about causation, the dispositions of material objects, and the universe, one will see that these do not allow for such an explanation; never mind that god is a human projection, a way of seeing our own image even behind phenomena we can’t even begin to control.

God is the name of an idealized human, infinite in every domain we are finite in: infinitely knowledgeable, powerful, moral, and good; every one of us will die and yet god is considered eternal. God is the name of human naiveté and arrogance, the notion that the creator of the universe must be a perfect version of ourselves. God is the name of the lack of imagination of our ancestors. If anything, imagination hasn’t discovered a super-human controlling and governing the universe; imagination has discovered natural forces that move celestial bodies and oversee their formation; imagination has scaled down the universe to previously incomprehensible small scales; imagination has proven once and for all that the universe is probabilistic, that chance rather than agency is more prevalent in the universe. Imagination has shown that the idea of god was borne from a lack of creativity rather than masterful ingenuity. Whether you like it or not, we are beyond the need for god as ultimate explanation or temporary placeholder; we are beyond the question of whether one exists. This is the age of post-theism.

The Philosophy of Batesian Mimicry

By R.N. Carmona

Before I talk about the philosophical depths and conundrums of this type of mimicry, allow me to define it. Batesian mimicry is when one species adapts the features of another, usually poisonous species, so as to protect itself from predators. The most common example is the viceroy who adapted the wing patterns of the monarch for sake of avoiding its predators; note: this might actually be an example of Müllerian mimicry. Evolutionary biologists and geneticists have a handle on the genomic going ons that contribute to this, but philosophically speaking, this form of mimicry is intriguing. It boggles my imagination.

Let me preface my remarks by saying that I’m far from sympathetic to pseudoscience and as such, I don’t think creationism gets any closer to explaining the why of Batesian mimicry. Intelligent design doesn’t either. I highly doubt that the god of the Bible is siding with the prey and therefore, harming the predator. The height of benevolence would want what’s best for both prey and predator and wouldn’t actively harm one or the other. There’s also the case of imperfect mimicry, so if one wants to imagine that a designer is writing code into the fabric of reality, the designer isn’t the perfect designer of monotheism. With that said, my philosophical hold up has nothing at all to do with creationism and/or intelligent design.

My question is this: how did the viceroy know that a monarch’s pattern would protect it from predators? Does it have enough intelligence to understand its surroundings that well? Did it, in other words, survey its surroundings to the degree that it understood that birds avoid monarchs because of their wing patterns? Assuming we relinquish our tendency to belittle animal intelligence, how did the viceroy have the power to put these genetic changes into motion? That, that (!) is a question science doesn’t seem to care to answer. We can vaguely say that nature made this happen, but that moves the question of agency into a vague, mindless concept. Furthermore, it doesn’t explain the power of an animal to rewrite its genome.

Philosophers from Plato to Kant suggested that there may be more to reality than we realize. Before the advent of quantum mechanics, philosophers understood that reality might not be as simple as it appears on what Kant called the phenomenal level. There may be more to it. The powers of mimicry may be a hint. In Doctor Strange, the Ancient One, portrayed by Tilda Swinton, suggested that cells can be made to repair themselves and organize in all sorts of ways. She also implied that doctors like him are accustomed to one known way and are unaware of others. Humans do not have powers of genetic changes that are directed to a given end in the way some animals do. Batesian, Müllerian, and acoustic mimicry might be a most unexpected vindication for thinkers like Kant.

Westworld inclines me to ideas of competing engineers coding and recoding the fabric of our reality. Perhaps the true nature of reality is an elaborate game, a desperate reach for data, a simulation aiming to remap history before the present the engineers find themselves in. Perhaps not. Not everything makes sense; not everything has to. The Ancient One was right about that as well, but there are aspects of nature that don’t appear to be confined to nature and certainly can’t be readily explained by nature in and of itself. The noumenal, the Hegelian Absolute is the overarching objectivity that humans, in all their subjectivity, are striving for. There are phenomena available to our perceptions that may suggest that our arms are much too short to reach up and grasp that object of our desire. Perhaps we are doomed to decades of subjectivity, an existence that never apprehends truth. For some of us, there’s certainly no comfort in that.

Maybe this is the price we pay for being aware of our consciousness. In being aware of our consciousness, we have been disconnected from the full fabric of reality. Because of this awareness, maybe we are veiled from that which lies behind the curtain. We believe ourselves to be on the stage performing in the most meaningful way and in the only way that’s considered significant when in actuality, we are the audience that sees but the shadows of the performance. We can explain mimicry in our very limited ways, but we’ve apprehended only shadows. We have nothing in the way of why and nothing in the way of explaining to what is nothing short of a super power. We have nothing in the way of explaining the will and agency that drives such mimicry and much less the awareness necessary to accomplish it. Plato may have been right. Here we sit in the cave…

Print is Now Live on Amazon.com!

Book is now available for purchase here! Here are the Table of Contents to whet the appetite:

Introduction

Chapter 1: Philosophical Approaches to Atheism

Chapter 2: Refuting the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Chapter 3: The Moral Argument Refuted

Chapter 4: Refuting Plantinga’s Victorious Ontological Argument

Chapter 5: On Qualia and A Refutation of the Argument from Consciousness

Chapter 6: Refuting the Fine-Tuning Argument

Chapter 7: The Failures of Aquinas’ Five Ways

Chapter 8: Transcendental Arguments and Presuppositionalism Refuted

Chapter 9: The Argument from Assailability

Chapter 10: The Arguments from History and The Multiplicity of Religions

Chapter 11: The Argument from Cosmology

Chapter 12: On the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

Conclusion

I hope you guys enjoy!

On The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

By R.N. Carmona

A Christian on the Humans of New York Instagram page brought up the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA) and named a few of its Christian defenders. Like I’m fond of pointing out, in naming just Christian defenders of the argument, it is likely he hasn’t considered actual objections. He’s read a degraded form of objections via the lens of these Christian authors. This is why I call apologetics, pseudo-philosophy.

In actual philosophical discourse, the participants in a given discussion are as charitable to one another as possible and they try very hard to ensure that nothing is lost in translation. They constantly correct themselves if they misinterpret what their opponent has said or they attempt to show that their interpretation better captures what their opponent is trying to say. Apologists don’t do this. Apologists straw man an objection, sometimes in ways that seem sophisticated, in order to make the argument or counter-argument easier to address. This is precisely why I advised him to deal with J.L. Mackie, for example–to read him directly and not through the lens of one of his favored authors. Then he would find that even Christians reject the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA).

A quick example of what I mean: in responding to my Argument From Cosmology, my opponent says that the opposite of my conclusion is as follows: the fact that an x can’t be shown to exist in relation to y doesn’t mean that x doesn’t exist*; in other words, that god can’t be shown to exist in relation to the Earth doesn’t mean god doesn’t exist. Yet on Judaism and Christianity, god created the Earth. Modern science tells us that planets have no creator; they form naturally over an extended period of time. We have real time data of planet formation in other systems. The history of our planet doesn’t resemble anything mentioned in the Bible. By extension, I argue that god doesn’t exist in relation to the universe, since he didn’t create it. Modern cosmology tells us as much.

His assertion is not enough to refute my argument. In fact, all he’s concluding is the opposite of what he misunderstood as my conclusion. My actual conclusion is this: x does not exist in relation to y iff it is necessary that x exist in relation to y. If god did not create the Earth or the universe, he doesn’t exist in relation to either, and by extension, doesn’t exist; however, on Christianity, it is necessary that he does. This is precisely what his favored LCA says. Through the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), for every being or state of affairs that exist, there is a sufficient reason for why they exist. It then adds, that for every being or state of affairs that exist, there is a necessary reason for why they exist. Therefore, god is the necessary and sufficient reason for why these states of affairs exist.

My Argument From Cosmology best captures a decisive criticism of the LCA without directly engaging it. J.L. Mackie stated that PSR need not be assumed by reason. Reason only asks for antecedent causes and conditions that explain each being or state of affairs. These are considered facts until they themselves are explained by something prior to them. On reason, nothing is prerequisite beyond this.

Thus, going back to my conclusion, x does not exist in relation to y iff it is necessary that x exist in relation to y. In order for Christianity to hold true, god would have had to create the Earth and the universe. If we have reason to doubt that he created the Earth, and modern science establishes this conclusively, then we have much reason to doubt that he created the universe. If the Earth can be explained by antecedent causes and conditions, then the universe can as well. My argument offers a number of plausible explanations fielded in modern cosmology all whilst arguing that there cannot be the type of causation Christians would require, i.e., the type of causation that allows for an immaterial agent to create material objects. At best, such causation is unknowable and it is probable that there will be no hard evidence for it; hence the Christian must retreat to agnosticism. At worst, such causation is impossible and there cannot be any evidence for it; thus, the Christian must retreat to atheism.

Ultimately, my argument addresses the LCA by implication, i.e., my argument implies a defeater of the LCA. Therefore, I do not have to address it directly. The same can be said of the KCA. Rebuttals to both arguments are implicit in my argument. That fact alone should give apologists pause.

In any case, my point has been made: apologetics is pseudo-philosophy. Apologists prop it up by being uncharitable and purposely (in most cases) misinterpreting a claim or argument made by atheists. Apologists are also modern sophists: it matters not how things might be or probably are; what matters is what they think is the case, what they say is the case, or what they deem possible–as though possibility implies probability. Apologists are also quite fond of straw men, which they use to make their arguments seem superior to those of their opponents. Unlike them, I have defined PSR correctly and I’ve summarized the LCA charitably. However, I’ve also shown that my Argument From Cosmology considers the LCA, albeit indirectly. My argument implies a decisive blow to the LCA. It is therefore necessary to deal with my argument directly; it isn’t enough to choose a favored argument and deem it superior on the basis of a misinterpretation of my conclusion.

*His assessment is correct assuming that x isn’t necessary with relation to y. The fact that I (x) cannot be explained with relation to an invention (y) doesn’t mean I do not exist. Even the actual inventor of invention (y) doesn’t have this sort of connection to the invention in question. Another agent could have been the inventor. On Christianity, however, there are no other gods and hence no other creators. Thus, if god did not create the Earth, there is reason to doubt he created anything else in the universe and therefore, the universe itself. As stated, for Christianity to be true, it need only be shown that god is necessary in this possible world; the LCA, as originally formulated, wants Anselm’s deity and therefore, on the LCA, god is necessary in all possible worlds. My argument casts much doubt on this, especially since god is the necessary being antecedent to all contingent beings. If this connection fails on a minor front, e.g., god didn’t create all baseballs, that’s fine, for even then he would underlie the reason for the reason of the baseballs, namely human beings. If it fails on a major front, as I’ve shown in the case of the Earth and all planets for that matter, a glaring problem arises for Christians, for even if they posit a being that willed the laws of physics, what they have is a deity far removed from the deity in the Bible. That would make for a separate discussion altogether.

The Evidence For Evolution: A Succinct Introduction For Denialists

By R.N. Carmona

In the U.S., there are a few striking examples of science denialism. Perhaps the most troubling among these instances is the rejection of evolution. Fundamentalist Christians have fought to keep evolution out of schools and have fought equally as hard to push creationism and/or Intelligent Design (ID) into the classroom. According to a 2014 Gallup poll, 42% of Americans deny evolution and accept creationism. Given this, it is imperative to be capable of explaining evolution and the evidence in support of it. Having this capacity does not ensure that denialists will come to accept it. There’s still the issue of comprehension; there is, in other words, a pervasive problem arising from two distinct and yet related facts: science denialists are not familiar with the relevant jargon and thus, cannot comprehend, for instance, an informal argument for evolution; science denialists usually have a disdain for both alternative opinions and reading and therefore, would forego reading a piece defending an alternative opinion. On that last issue, they would much rather accuse an “evolutionist” of lacking substance or not being an expert–despite the fact that said individual is citing experts and reputable sources. Given this, it is necessary to be brief and effective when presenting the evidence for evolution. This is what I’ll endeavor to do here.

There are a number of lines of evidence for evolution: biogeographic distribution, homologies, atavisms, vestigial organs and traits, and perhaps the most compelling stemming from genetics: GLO (short for gulono-y-lactone oxidase) and ERVs (endogenous retroviruses), which will be discussed at length. Since I am not an expert and I am sans pretenses to the contrary, I will cite reputable sources and experts in order to make a brief case. Since the evidence for evolution is vast and requires a grasp of multiple sciences–e.g., paleontology, anthropology, genetics, evolutionary biology, environmental science–I will narrow my focus and speak only of the evidence that is arguably most compelling. I will begin with GLO, which is a pseudogene or a non-functional gene. Jerry A. Coyne, Professor of Biology at the University of Chicago, provides one of the better evidences of evolution:

The most famous human pseudogene is GLO, so called because in other species it produces an enzyme called L-gulono-y-lactone oxidase.  This enzyme is used in making vitamin C (ascorbic acid) from the simple sugar glucose.  Vitamin C is essential for proper metabolism, and virtually all mammals have the pathway to make it — all, that is, except for primates, fruit bats, and guinea pigs.  In these species, Vitamin C is obtained directly from their food, and normal diets usually have enough.  If we don’t ingest enough vitamin C, we get sick: scurvy was common among fruit-deprived seamen of the nineteenth century.  The reason why primates and these few other mammals don’t make their own vitamin C is because they don’t need to.  Yet DNA sequencing tells us that primates still carry most of the genetic information needed to make the vitamin.

It turns out that the pathway for making vitamin C from glucose involves a sequence of four steps, each promoted by the product of a different gene.  Primates and guinea pigs still have active genes for the first three steps, but the last step, which requires the GLO enzyme, doesn’t take place:  GLO has been inactivated by a mutation.  It has become a pseudogene, called ΨGLO (Ψ is the Greek letter psi, standing for “pseudo”).  ΨGLO doesn’t work because a single nucleotide in the gene’s DNA sequence is missing.  And it’s exactly the same nucleotide missing in other primates.  This shows that the mutation that destroyed our ability to make vitamin C was present in the ancestor of all primates, and was passed on to its descendants.  The inactivation of GLO in guinea pigs happened independently, since it involves different mutations.  It’s highly likely that since fruit bats, guinea pigs, and primates got plenty of vitamin C in their diet, there was no penalty for inactivating the pathway that made it.  This could even have been beneficial since it eliminated a protein that might have been costly to produce.

A dead gene in one species that is active in its relatives is evidence for evolution, but there’s more.  When you look at ΨGLO in living primates, you find out that its sequence is more similar between close relatives than between more distant ones.  The sequence of human and chimp ΨGLO, for example, resemble each other closely, but differ more from the ΨGLO of orangutans which are more distant relatives.  What’s more, the sequence of guinea pig ΨGLO is very different from that of all primates.

Only evolution and common ancestry can explain these facts.  All mammals inherited a functional copy of the GLO gene.  About 40 million years ago, in the common ancestor of all primates, a gene that was no longer needed was inactivated by mutation.  All primates inherited that same mutation.  After GLO was silenced, other mutations continued to occur in the gene that was no longer expressed.  These mutations accumulated over time — they are harmless if they occur in genes that are already dead — and were passed on to descendant species.  Since closer relatives share a common ancestor more recently, genes that change in a time-dependent way follow the pattern of common ancestry, leading to DNA sequences more similar in close than in distant relatives.  This occurs whether or not a gene is dead.  The sequence of ΨGLO in guinea pigs is so different because it was inactivated independently, in a lineage that had already diverged from that of primates.  And ΨGLO is not unique in showing such patterns: there are many other such pseudogenes.1

The above is a compelling example demonstrating that we share a common ancestor with apes and monkeys. However, it arguably isn’t the most compelling example serving as evidence for evolution. Another example of such a gene demonstrates that we descend from egg-laying ancestors. Dennis Venema, Biologist at Trinity Western University, stated the following:

Common ancestry also predicts that, beyond human-chimpanzee common ancestry, the common primate ancestor also shares ancestry with other vertebrates in the more distant past. For example, evolutionary theory predicts that humans, like all vertebrates, are descended from egg-laying ancestors. As with all placental mammals, humans do not use egg yolk as a source of nutrition for their embryos. Other vertebrates such as fish and birds do employ egg yolk, as do a small number of extant mammals such as the platypus.

They found that these genes were present side-by-side and functional in the human genome; then they performed an examination of human sequence between them. As expected, the heavily mutated, pseudogenized sequence of the vitellogenin gene was present in the human genome at this precise location. The human genome thus contains the mutated remains of a gene devoted to egg yolk formation in egg-laying vertebrates at the precise location predicted by shared synteny derived from common ancestry.2

Another line of evidence for evolution comes from molecular biology, namely endogenous retroviruses. In humans, “endogenous retroviruses (HERVs) represent footprints of previous retroviral infection and have been termed “fossil viruses.”3 Also, ” it has been shown that the human genome contains numerous ERVs (HERVs) distributed in several multigenic families comprising a few to several hundreds elements (264548). These elements are hallmarks of ancient infections of the germ line by retroviruses which have thereafter been “endogenized” and can be used as molecular markers of evolution.”4

Someone who doesn’t believe in evolution needs to offer alternative explanations for these facts. Their probable next move is predictable: indulge their confirmation bias by consulting creationist and intelligent design websites. Those sites will certainly have “refutations” of these facts, but keep in mind, having a Ph.D. doesn’t imply that one has expertise even on matters unrelated to what one studied. In other words, a Ph.D. in law doesn’t mean one can speak with authority on biology; a Ph.D. in biochemistry doesn’t mean one can speak with authority on physics. This is a common mistake made by creationists: anyone with a Ph.D. is an authority on absolutely anything they purport to be an expert in. Donald Prothero, who was a Professor geology and paleontology for 35 years, states the following:

One of the principal symbols of authority in scholarship and science is the Ph.D. degree. But you don’t need a Ph.D. to do good science, and not all people who have Ph.D.s are good scientists either. As those of us who have gone through the ordeal know, a Ph.D. only proves that you can survive a grueling test of endurance in doing research and writing a dissertation on a very narrow topic. It doesn’t prove that you are smarter than anyone else or more qualified to render an opinion than anyone else. Because earning a Ph.D. requires enormous focus on a specific area, many people with that degree have actually lost a lot of their scholarly breadth and knowledge of other fields in the process of focusing on their theses.

In particular, it is common for people making extraordinary claims (like creationism or alien abductions or psychic powers) to wear Ph.D. (if they have one) like a badge, advertise it prominently on their book covers, and feature it in their biographies. They know that it will impress and awe the listener or reader into thinking they are smarter than anyone else or more qualified to pronounce on a topic. Nonsense! Unless the claimant has earned a Ph.D. in the subject being discussed, the degree is entirely irrelevant to the controversy. For example, leading creationists include Duane Gish, who has a doctorate in biochemistry, and the late Henry Morris, who had a Ph.D. in hydraulic engineering. However, they both earned their degrees almost 50 years ago, so they are not likely to be up-to-date on these rapidly changing fields that they have not practiced in decades. If they stuck to discussing just those topics, they might be halfway believable, but all their criticisms focus on the fossil record, geology, thermodynamics, and so on—topics in which they have absolutely no first-hand experience, published research, or training. Their entire knowledge of these fields (vividly demonstrated by reading their books) consists of skimming and misquoting popular books by real experts in those fields who did the actual work, not going out and doing the research themselves or publishing in peer-reviewed journals. They are no more qualified to comment on paleontology, geology, or thermodynamics than they are qualified to critique music theory! Yet they always flaunt their Ph.D.s to awe the masses and try to intimidate their opponents. The same goes for creationists like Jonathan Sarfati (physical chemistry), Michael Behe (biochemistry), and Jonathan Wells (cell biology)—none of those subjects gives them ANY background in fossils or paleontology, and none has published in any peer-reviewed paleontological journals, so they are complete amateurs when it comes to fossils.5

Given this, one can’t trust any purported authority. One must consult actual experts. Going back to what was mentioned earlier, the issue all creationists and ID advocates have, is that they have a misunderstanding of science. The Christian persecution complex is palpable among such people. They honestly and generally believe that their ideas are being suppressed by the scientific community, a sentiment overtly present in Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed. That sentiment is, however, wrong since it has no place in science. Carl Sagan said it best: “The suppression of uncomfortable ideas may be common in religion or in politics, but it is not the path to knowledge, and there’s no place for it in the endeavor of science.”6

Therefore, it is something about creationism and ID that exempt them from science. The reason they’re exempt is not simply because they’re religiously motivated views, but because they’re akin to astrology, homeopathy, and alchemy—i.e. they are pseudoscience. Jack Ritchie puts it succinctly:

Science is a self-critical enterprise. It provides resources for criticizing itself and other disciplines. We have good and obvious reasons to exclude topics such as astrology or creation science. These disciplines are not successful by their own lights. Astrologers do not accurately predict people’s future on the basis of planetary motions. Advocates of intelligent design, whatever the merits of the problems they raise for various parts of the theory of evolution, have no alternative scientific story to put in its place; they have no suggestion as to how to undertake research into the nature of the “intelligent designer.” Science is different. The sciences have made progress—at least by their own lights. Physicists know more about the subatomic realm than before. No doubt the Large Hadron Collider will enhance that process. Evolutionary biologists know more about the evolutionary process than Darwin. Good science is, furthermore, rich in unsolved problems that this deeper knowledge throws up. We don’t need any general definitions or criteria of what science is to make these points.7

The lack of success of these views is literally the tip of the iceberg. That they’re not successful isn’t what determines that they’re pseudoscience. Pick any of the demarcation theories put forth by philosophers of science and you’ll find that creationism and ID don’t meet the requirements to pass as science. Take, for example, Popper’s falsification. Can we falsify the intelligent designer who, according to many ID advocates, is the Judeo-Christian god? What matters here is not whether a naturalist or an atheist can falsify him. What matters is whether ID advocates are willing to attempt falsification of the intelligent designer. Since their view is rooted in religion, we can be reasonably certain that they’re not going to attempt to falsify the intelligent designer.

Let’s assume, however, that Popper’s falsification isn’t a good marker of demarcation. Let’s instead go with Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. Let’s assume that creationist and ID advocates try for centuries to locate this intelligent designer or creator. Will they put a new theory in place and allow their enterprise to go through a paradigm shift? In other words, will they, like early chemists who discarded Phlogiston theory and introduced theories that better describe the phenomena in question, introduce a new theory that perhaps eliminates an intelligent designer or creator altogether? Again, we can reasonably expect that no matter the evidence, no matter how stacked the odds are, creationists and ID advocates will not discard their current theory in favor of more tenable ones.

Let’s set Kuhn aside. Perhaps his demarcation marker is wrong. Let’s instead look at creationism and ID from the point of view of Lakatos’ research programmes. Lakatos posited that within normal science there are research programmes. The aim of science isn’t hypotheses in isolation or trial and error or conjectures followed by refutations. According to Lakatos, the reason Copernicanism succeeded where Ptolemy’s astronomy failed is because Ptolemy’s astronomy lagged behind as a research programme. The facts, especially after Galileo, supported heliocentrism rather than Ptolemy’s geocentrism, which featured epicycles. Are creationism or ID viable research programmes? No because their so called scientists are not doing normal science. Furthermore, they have no heuristic that serves as a problem-solving mechanism. Therefore, on Lakatos’ view, creationism and ID don’t qualify as science.

With this brief survey of demarcation theories in the philosophy of science, one can see that creationism and ID don’t qualify as science under any of these theories. That’s a problem. It follows that creationism and ID are not suppressed. Rather, it’s that they don’t qualify as scientific theories. Their proponents don’t participate in normal science. They have no research programme in place. They have no interest in falsifying their theory. ID and creationism do not belong in the science classroom and definitely not in a scientific discussion.

Given the case above, creationism and ID should be rejected. They are pseudoscientific theories. Even if they could be falsified, proponents of ID or creationism have no interest in falsifying them. This is due to the fact that advocates of these theories are not practicing normal science. As we can gather from what Prothero said, creationist and ID advocates mislead people with Ph.D.s in normal sciences. However, some of these fields progress rapidly and they are thus required to stay up to date on the changes in their field. This is usually not the case given that some of these people received their Ph.D.s literal decades ago. Therefore, their authority is dubious and upon closer examination, entirely lacking. These purported experts cannot be trusted. Yet this isn’t the reason evolution should be accepted. The reasons outlined above are great starting points. The experts cited are also trustworthy scholars who have done far more work in their respective fields than I was able to showcase here. My hope is that readers who are currently evolution denialists make the choice of doing honest research and coming away with a level of understanding they currently lack.

Works Cited

1 Coyne, Jerry A. Why Evolution Is True. New York: Viking, 2009. 67-69. Print.

2 Dennis Veneme as quoted in Farrell, John. “The Fossils in Our Genes”Forbes. 21 Oct 2011. Web. 22 Dec 2014.

3 Nelson PN, Carnegie PR, Martin J, et al. Demystified. Human endogenous retroviruses. Mol Pathol. 2003; 56:11–8.

4 Benit L., Dessen P., Heidmann T. Identification, phylogeny, and evolution of retroviral elements based on their envelope genes. J. Virol. 2001; 75:11709–11719. doi: 10.1128/JVI.75.23.11709-11719.2001.

5 Prothero, Donald R., and Carl Dennis Buell. Evolution: What the Fossils Say and Why it Matters. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 16. Print. 

6 Sagan, Carl. Cosmos, Ep 4: Heaven and Hell. 1980. Web. 22 Dec 2014.

7 Ritchie, Jack. Understanding Naturalism. Stocksfield, England: Acumen, 2008. 108. Print.

Arguments Christians Should No Longer Use

By R.N. Carmona

With the exception of the last tactic on the list (obscurantism), I’ve attempted to place the arguments in an order proportional to their degree of weakness. In other words, none of the arguments below are strong arguments or tactics for the existence of a god. All of the arguments are weak, but some are undoubtedly weaker than others; to put it bluntly, some of these arguments are plain foolish and it is difficult to explain why they’re so frequently used. So let us turn now to what I think is the weakest argument frequently used by Christians.

The “Faith in Science” Argument

This argument is perhaps the weakest argument offered by Christians. In more than three years of blogging, I’ve experienced this argument countless times–most recently twice within the same week (see here and here). Given the ensuing length of this post, you can read those responses to see why the argument is simply bad. There’s no reason to beat a dead horse.

The Argument From Consequences

The most common version of this argument is one attempting to link atheism and nihilism. Some Christians would go as far as to say that modern atheists aren’t really atheists. A Tumblr Catholic posted the following unsourced quote from Father Baron:

… at least the existentialists were serious about their atheism — they saw the implications of it. I think what we see in a lot of the New Atheism is a kind of frivolous, or superficial, or childish atheism, a kind of playing at atheism.

Jerry Coyne writes:  “atheists simply aren’t dolorous enough about our nonbelief; Like Nietzsche, we should be mourning the death of God, which takes away from us a grounded morality, and one that we haven’t replaced it with a solid secularly-based morality.“1 Coyne isn’t agreeing with this sentiment; he’s objecting to it. This argument can often piggyback on the Moral Argument for God. We’ll discuss this argument later.

Even if it were the case that there is a salient connection between atheism and nihilism, this still wouldn’t imply that atheism is false. Truth often has uncomfortable implications. “How can you believe in natural disasters? They kill so many people and destroy so many things.” Obviously, this type of contention doesn’t show that natural disasters don’t happen. They do happen and it’s true that they destroy things and kill people, but the fact that natural disasters lead to discomforting consequences doesn’t mean they don’t occur or better said, that we should deny that they occur or force ourselves to believe that they don’t on the basis that its more comforting to do so.

Likewise, if it’s true that nihilism follows from atheism, then if atheism is true, life is devoid of meaning. That life is devoid of meaning if atheism is true doesn’t mean that theism has to be true because a meaningful life is more comforting. Conversely, this same reasoning can be applied to notions of an afterlife. The finality of death is uncomfortable for most people who dwell on it, but that it’s uncomfortable doesn’t make it false.

Such arguments are fallacious because they appeal to consequences. Whether one appeals to desirable or undesirable consequences doesn’t make a difference. Aside from the aforementioned example, one will often hear Christians state that evolution must be false because if it isn’t, we’re equal to animals. One will also hear that since eternal life is preferable, heaven must exist. The desirability or undesirability of a given consequence(s) doesn’t prove or disprove any proposition.

In any event, this still doesn’t prevent atheists from finding meaning in life. Nietzsche’s nihilism isn’t an atheist’s only choice when it comes to existentialism. His nihilism can be considered the epistemic equivalent to atheism: atheism is the lack of belief in gods; nihilism is the lack of belief in meaning in life. However, like the question of god, there are alternatives and a middle ground. For instance, absurdism is to existentialism what agnosticism is to the question of god; while absurdism states that there’s an incongruence between our desire for meaning in life and the lack of meaning in the universe, agnosticism states that the question of god is unanswerable because whether or not god exists is unknowable. They both posit an unknowability. An atheist can also choose to believe in self-generated meaning; this attitude originates in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre though Sartre’s existentialism is more metaphysical given his heavy emphasis on the concept of being.

The Argument From Martyrdom

This argument is less frequently used and for good reason. Aside from the assumption that something is true given that people die for it, it completely ignores the fact that people have died for the sake of other religions. Aside from that, people have died for ideologies (e.g. Nazism, racism, nationalism). Richard Carrier puts it succinctly:

[T]he fact that believers are willing to die for their belief does not confirm their belief is true, since there have been willing martyrs for Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Marxism, even paganism, and many other religions and ideologies throughout history. In the right social conditions, such martyrdom doesn’t even slow recruitment because such willingness to die is normal for such movements, not unusual. As W.H.C. Frend says of that time, “there was a living pagan tradition of self-sacrifice for a cause, a preparedness if necessary to defy an unjust rule, that existed alongside the developing Christian concept of martyrdom inherited from Judaism.” Christian martyrdom particularly made sense from a cultural and sociological perspective. Many sociologists studying world martyrdom movements have found they have a common social underpinning throughout history, from aboriginal movements in the New World to Islamic movements in the Middle East. For example, Alan Segal says that in every well-documented case a widespread inclination to martyrdom “is an oblique attack by the powerless against the power of oppressors,” in effect “canceling the power of an oppressor through moral claims to higher ground and to a resolute claim to the afterlife, as the better” and only “permanent” reward. “From modern examples,” Segal concludes, “we can see that what produces martyrdom,” besides the corresponding “exaltation of the afterlife,” is “a colonial and imperial situation, a conquering power, and a subject people whose religion does not easily account for the conquest.” Some of these subjects are “predisposed to understand events in a religious context,” and are suffering from some “political or economic” deprivation, or even social or cultural deprivation (as when the most heartfelt morals of the subgroup are not recognized or realized by the dominating power structure).2

Matthew Ferguson takes the wheels off this argument by investigating “the circumstances of the apostles’ deaths” and finding “that they are virtually all ahistorical legends, full of contradictions, and little more than magical absurdities.”3 This argument isn’t cogent and while not as bad as the previous argument, it’s still a bad argument.

The Design/Watchmaker Argument

This argument has taken on various forms over time and though it’s closely related to one of the notable arguments below (namely, the God-of-the-Gaps Argument), it’s an argument unto itself.  The argument was originated by William Paley who opened his book, Natural Theology (1802), with the following:

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that for any thing I know to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissable in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz., that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose … This mechanism being observed … the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place of other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.4

This argument has modern variants: Kyle Butt, in his debate with Dan Barker, employed the Watchmaker Argument but instead of a watch, he asked us to imagine stumbling upon a laptop on a beach.5 This argument is rightfully called the Watchmaker Fallacy. This analysis of the argument is correct since the argument hinges on a false analogy. That something appears designed doesn’t mean it is. It’s also non-sequitur to infer design where there’s no evidence of any.

A more modern iteration of the Design argument, which is a teleological argument, is the Fine-Tuning Argument. Sean Carroll, in his debate with William Lane Craig, offers a rebuttal against the Fine-Tuning Argument:

Even if you think the universe is finely-tuned and you don’t think that naturalism can solve it, theism certainly does not solve it. If you thought it did, if you played the game honestly, what you would say is, ‘here is the universe I expect to exist under theism; I will compare it to the data and see if it fits.’ What kind of universe would we expect? And I claim that over and over again the universe we expect matches the predictions of naturalism, not theism. So the amount of tuning—if you thought the physical parameters of our universe were tuned in order to allow life to exist—you would expect enough tuning but not too much. Under naturalism a physical mechanism could far over-tune by an incredibly large amount that has nothing to do with the existence of life, and that is exactly what we observe. For example, the entropy of the early universe is much, much, much, much lower than it needs to be to allow for life. You would expect under theism that the particles and parameters of particle physics would be enough to allow life to exist and have some structure that was designed for some reason; whereas under naturalism, you’d expect them to be kind of random and a mess. Guess what? They are kind of random and a mess. You would expect under theism life to play a special role in the universe; under naturalism you’d expect life to be very insignificant. I hope I don’t need to tell you, life is very insignificant as far as the universe is concerned.6

In another lecture on this topic, Carroll offers the possibility that the parameters aren’t as fine-tuned as we think when concerning life and that it’s presumptuous to assume that we understand perfectly when life could exist, since different parameters might yield different forms of life. He adds that if we were serious about this argument, we’d consider all possible theories, all cosmologies arising as a result of those theories, all possible manifestations of life and consciousness, and calculate which universes among all possible universes are life-bearing. He also points to a specific case of over-tuning, which is the entropy of the early universe. At 10^10^120, the entropy of the early universe is enormously smaller than it needs to be to allow for the existence of life.7

Victor Stenger notices a case of double think among proponents of this argument. In other words, he notices a common inconsistency among apologists and their admirers.

On the one hand the creationists and God-of-the-gaps evolutionists argue that nature is too uncongenial for life to have developed totally naturally, and so therefore supernatural input must have occurred. On the other hand, the fine-tuners (often the same people) argue that the constants and laws of nature are exquisitely congenial to life, and so therefore they must have been supernaturally created. They can’t have it both ways.8

Aside from the fallacies already mentioned, the argument is a case of agency over-detection. Proponents of this argument are inferring agency where there isn’t any. Furthermore, they’re engaging in confirmation bias. For instance, to them, the Earth is obviously created and bears the marks of fine-tuning. However, they ignore cases in modern astrophysics which show planets forming naturally and without any discernible purpose.9 Given such cases, the Earth isn’t the exception to the rule. It’s likelier that the Earth was the product of naturalistic processes.

The “Atheist Atrocities” Argument

This argument is quite common. Whether it’s an attempt to poison the well by making atheism look bad or simply a response to an atheist who brings up The Dark Ages is hard to notice. In any event, even if it were true, the argument would rest on a fallacy–namely tu quoqueTu quoque is a “you too” puerile response that forgets that two wrongs don’t make a right. Whether the argument is made on a whim or as an attempted rebuttal doesn’t change the fact that a fallacy is being committed. If on a whim, the Christian is poisoning the well; if as a response, they’re committing tu quoque: “sure Christians have killed in the name of Jesus, but atheists murdered millions in the name of atheism!”

Unfortunately for the Christian, this is an oversimplification of what actually happened. It ignores, especially in Mao’s and Pol Pot’s cases, a number of facts that have to be accounted for. Michael Sherlock shared a well-researched piece very recently.10 Any Christian who puts stock in this argument owes it to him/herself to read it.

Pascal’s Wager

This is an argument that apologists claim isn’t understood by modern believers and atheists. This is apparently why we have colloquial variants of the argument: “it’s better to believe in God; this way you’ll avoid going to Hell.” Unfortunately, this argument isn’t misunderstood because it’s precisely what Pascal argued.

On the basis of doxastic voluntarism, Pascal assumed that we can choose whether or not to believe. He therefore offered scenarios: if one believes, there’s an infinite reward, whereas if one disbelieves, there’s infinite punishment. He also argued that even if god’s existence were 50/50, it would still be more rational to believe on the basis of expectations.11

The multiplicity argument, first offered by Denis Diderot, is one of the more common rebuttals. A short video posted on YouTube by Theramin Trees illustrates it succinctly.12 The rebuttal refutes Pascal’s two-two matrix. The matrix is clearly not a two-two matrix. It’s not as simple as belief versus non-belief in the Judeo-Christian god. There are consequences if you choose to believe in this god though Allah exists or choose to believe in Allah though Krishna exists. There are myriad religions with multifarious consequences for rejecting the purported truth offered by said religion. Some religions, on the other hand, don’t carry any consequences for disbelief and thus, if they turned out to be true, the non-believer wouldn’t face punishment of any kind.

While the multiplicity argument is a strong rebuttal, I think a more pointed rebuttal rests on the same decision theory employed by Pascal. I introduced the thought process of investors and gamblers to show that risk is taken only when real rewards are available.13 On Christianity, there’s no definitive way to know that there’s reward for one’s risk. The afterlife and all its rewards are believed on the basis of faith rather than fact. This isn’t the case with investing and gambling. Furthermore, as surveyed in this post so far, there’s no good reason to wager on the Judeo-Christian god.

The Moral Argument(s)

In case anyone is still inclined to think that the laws of nature can be identified with the commands of a superior being, it is worth pointing out that this analysis cannot be correct. It is already an objection to it that it burdens our science with all the uncertainty of our metaphysics, or our theology. If it should turn out that we had no good reason to believe in the existence of such a superior being, or no good reason to believe that he issued any commands, it would follow, on this analysis, that we should not be entitled to believe that there were any laws of nature. But the main argument against this view is independent of any doubt that one may have about the existence of a superior being. Even if we knew that such a one existed, and that he regulated nature, we still could not identify the laws of nature with his commands. For it is only by discovering what were the laws of nature that we could know what form these commands had taken. But this implies that we have some independent criteria for deciding what the laws of nature are. The assumption that they are imposed by a superior being is therefore idle, in the same way as the assumption of providence is idle. It is only if there are independent means of finding out what is going to happen that one is able to say what providence has in store. The same objection applies to the rather more fashionable view that moral laws are the commands of a superior being.14

The Moral Argument for God states that since objective values and duties exist, god exists. A relativist will disagree with the former assertion. My view is that the Moral Argument for God, which is rooted in substantive realism, has the story backward. Substantive realism is the view that states that “there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts, which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track.”15 The fatal flaws of this position are as follows:

  • Whether one argues that morality is simply objective and that it exists independently, or that it’s objective because it hinges on god and exists independently insofar as its being is conferred by god, the view begs the question and thus isn’t epistemically justified.
  • Given that the view begs the question, we need to look elsewhere; in other words, given that it isn’t enough to posit that morality is contingent on a deity, we’ve more work to do.
  • Enter procedural realism: “there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them.”16
  • Such a procedure would be Kant’s CI procedure or Smith’s problem-solution model. Or it could be something simpler. The procedures could even vary. One thing is clear, however: morality is constructivist and more specifically procedural and this is evidenced by the codification of law throughout history.

Conversely, that law descends from a sovereign was fashionable in one of the earliest theories of law. John Austin’s Command Theory, which is arguably the first fully developed positivist theory of law, stated that law was the command of a sovereign. By sovereign, Austin wasn’t referring to a god, but rather, to a king. This portrait of the law was supplanted by H.L.A. Hart’s Model of Rules17, which is an alternative positivist theory of law, and then later by Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Integrity, which is a non-positivist theory of law.18 In brief, the reason these theories supplant Austin’s is because his theory doesn’t accurately apply to governments like those found in the US and England. The notion of sovereignty is either nonexistent or conflicting in some governments and therefore, Austin’s theory is inadequate. Hart’s theory is actually a generalization of Austin’s theory and therefore, encompasses the types of governments accurately described by Austin’s theory and governments his theory fails to describe. In any event, notions of a divine sovereign cause problems as my reductio ad absurdum of Divine Command Theory demonstrates.19

Kant’s CI Procedure and Adam Smith’s Problem-Solution Model are detailed in this response to a defender of the moral argument. These concepts are simply too broad to cover here. Also, along Goldstein’s suggestion of morality operating like an algorithm, I suggested two types of moral algorithms that may exist in the human mind if we are to assume CTM (Computational Theory of Mind).20

If this is too esoteric, one can easily attack the first premise of the Moral Argument for God: if god does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. The premise contains a hidden presupposition. One cannot simply assume that objective moral values and duties can’t exist without god. The premise, in essence, assumes the conclusion of the argument and thus, reveals a veiled circularity. The premise is therefore, unsound.

The argument only pretends to give us an origin for morality, whereas my explanation is both philosophically and scientifically sound. Generally speaking, humans are moral agents. This, in part, can be traced given evolution. There are, for instance, empathy, cooperation, and care for kin in nature. Therefore, the rudiments of morality can be seen in nature and not surprisingly, it is mostly seen in mammals—the phylum we pertain to. Given our common ancestry and given the congruence of our brains, whatever procedures (e.g. problem-solution; CI procedure) we employ to answer moral questions will be objective. Even if it doesn’t start out that way, it will end up that way (e.g. Kant’s Kingdom of Ends). Also, given that morality is an example of crowd-sourced knowledge, the peculiarities of this or that individual or group will eventually be weeded out.

An explanation on the origin of morality can consist of the following parts: evolution and/or neurobiology, genetics, cultural evolution, etc. The reason I offer a choice between evolution and neurobiology is because people have questioned whether evolution is necessary when explaining morality. In other words, who’s to say we evolved to be moral? What if our moral instincts find their origin in our brains? This is Churchland’s line of thinking in her book Braintrust. Then again, contrast that with Korsgaard’s view, which is based on Nietzsche’s internalization of man.  She maintains that we, as primates, may have internalized what was once external authority. In other words, when you look at most primate societies, you’ll find an alpha. This alpha serves as an authority. As h.sapien became a separate biological population, this sort of authority was seldom needed.  Eventually, we developed autonomy and upon doing so, we internalized the authority that was once external. In this sense, evolution can serve as morality’s foundation.

Aside from the fact that the Moral Argument is redundantly offered as a so called ironclad proof of god, Christians commonly demonstrate ignorance of ethics. None of the Christians I’ve spoken to are aware of alternatives. The most common tripe is that if we don’t accept the Moral Argument, relativism ensues. I’ve yet to meet a Christian who doesn’t assume all atheists are moral relativists. They couldn’t summarize moral nihilism, contractualism, consequentialism, utilitarianism, procedural realism, etc. even if their lives depended on it. On philosophy, this sort of behavior is unacceptable. One can’t simply side with a position without considering alternatives. It isn’t enough to state that one knows the truth if one never set out in search of it.

Also, and this is rather pathetic, they show no sign of knowing of better alternatives on their end. Take, for example, Leibniz’s Natural Law, which takes morality to be independent of god and considers it to consist of “eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect, so to speak, the essence of divinity itself.”21 Rather than hinge on a particular god, the view hinges on the existence of metaphysical entities that include morality. This is a more general postulate of religion. Going back to my summary of the problems faced by substantive realism, all it would take is one alteration to apply those same problems to Leibniz’s view (i.e. given that it isn’t enough to proffer that morality has independent existence, we have more work to do).

The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Popularized by William Lane Craig, this argument is mostly presented by admirers of Craig or people who want to be or fancy themselves apologists. Whether from a scientific or philosophical angle, the argument is unsound.

Scientifically speaking, Craig attempts to provide support for the KCA by citing the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. Craig offered the following in his debate with Sean Carroll:

In 2003 Arvind Borde, Alan Guth, and Alexander Vilenkin were able to show that any universe, which is on average in a state of cosmic expansion throughout its history, cannot be infinite in the past but must have a beginning.22

This is false as Carroll pointed out:

So I’d like to talk about the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, since Dr.Craig emphasizes it. And the rough translation is that in some universes—not all—the space-time description that we have as a classical space-time breaks down at some point in the past. Where Dr.Craig says that the Borde-Guth-Vilken theorem implies the universe had a beginning, that is false. That is not what it says. What is says is that our ability to describe the universe classically—that is to say, not including the effects of quantum mechanics—gives out. That maybe because there’s a beginning or it maybe because the universe is eternal—either because the assumptions of the theorem were violated or because quantum mechanics becomes important.23

Carroll would later state that he talked to Alan Guth. Guth then popped up on the projector holding up a sign that read: “the universe probably didn’t have a beginning, and is very likely eternal.”24

Given this, it’s safe to conclude that the KCA has no scientific support. A misapplication of cosmology and theoretical physics merely appears to support it. Upon scrutiny, this seeming support folds. The KCA isn’t empirically established because though Big Bang cosmology is the current paradigm in modern cosmology, it isn’t set in stone. There are details that need to be ironed out and some of these details are damning to the notion of creation (e.g. primordial gravitational waves, which imply inflation; inflation then implies the inflationary multiverse).

Philosophically speaking, there are two issues with the KCA that are condemning. Both of these issues arise from the first premise: whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence. One could, for example, apply Humean causal skepticism to P1 of the KCA. This isn’t as absurd as some people may think. C.S. Peirce, who many consider the greatest American philosopher, stated the following:

In order to explain what I mean, let us take one of the most familiar, although not one of the most scientifically accurate statements of the axiom viz.: that every event has a cause. I question whether this is exactly true. Bodies obey sensibly the laws of mechanics; but may it not be that if our means of measurement were inconceivably nicer, or if we were to wait inconceivable ages for an exception, exceptions irreducible in their own nature to any law would be found? In short, may it not be that chance, in the Aristotelian sense, mere absence of cause, has to be admitted as having some slight place in the universe.25

I note that Peirce is well-respected, in this case, because it must be stressed that this wasn’t offered by some quack pseudo-philosopher who pretended to know what he was talking about. Humean causal skepticism is a perfectly valid approach to the KCA. His causal skepticism can possibly be traced back to the following:

To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a cause: ’Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. ’Tis suppos’d to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which tho’ they may be deny’d with the lips, ’tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. But if we examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above-explain’d, we shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but on the contrary shall find, that ’tis of a nature quite foreign to that species of conviction.26

In employing causal skepticism, I entertained the possibility that dispositions explain what we otherwise would call cause and effect.27 From this, in my initial response to Edward Feser, I noted that a material condition has to be met given that dispositions are the case.28 This material condition isn’t met by god. In other words, since god is universally considered to be an immaterial being, he hasn’t the dispositionality to interact with and/or within the universe. Also, since my material condition encompasses Hume’s spatio-temporal condition, there’s no way for god to interact within space-time–since he is also considered to be transcendental (i.e. existing outside of space-time).

The second issue we encounter in P1 is double think. There’s an inconsistency inherent in any Christian who cites the Problem of Induction to discredit science, but consciously misses or avoids it in P1 of the KCA. The KCA is a deductive argument, but P1 imports inductive reasoning.29 Therefore, if the Problem of Induction is an outstanding problem–as some Christians will argue–then the proposition in P1 isn’t established. The argument, therefore, doesn’t follow.

The Ontological Argument

Every version of this argument hinges on one or more of the following: Leibnizian Possible Worlds, Leibnizian Necessity, or Anselm’s notion of conceivability. He argues that since we can’t imagine or conceive of a being greater than god, god exists. A criticism offered by Gaunilo of Marmoutier is still the most common rebuttal of the argument. Anselm never justifies his move from conceivability to reality. In other words, Anselm never legitimizes his move from the idea to an existing entity that corresponds to that idea.30 A theist may object to the following statement, but a close analysis of modern variants of Anselm’s Ontological Argument (e.g. Alvin Plantinga’s), demonstrates that this same mistake is repeated. So though such arguments are considered revisions of the original formulation, they do nothing to respond to Gaunilo’s original criticism.

For instance, Plantinga’s version of the argument begins with the following as its first premise: “There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatness is exemplified.”31 Not only does this contain a veiled presupposition, but it also implies a transfer from conceivability to reality by offering a proposition that expresses the idea as though it is true in reality. This then follows to the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument, which states that unsurpassable greatness exists in every possible world.

Another version of the argument doesn’t make use of this concept or possible worlds. It instead hinges on Leibniz’s notion of necessity. This is to be contrasted with contingency and impossibility. While the Modal Ontological Argument is a valid argument for a necessary being, the inverse of the argument is a valid argument for an impossible being. Therefore, when choosing between the two, we have to figure out which argument is sound because it cannot be the case that god is both necessary and impossible.32 He either exists or he doesn’t.

Obscurantism

Given the failure of the above arguments and the arguments below, another common tactic is obscurantism. This isn’t so much an argument, but rather, a response to the failure of theistic arguments. Others are dishonest and claim that the tactic is original to Patristic thought (i.e. the thoughts of early Church Fathers). David Bentley Hart would make that argument. In any case, you can’t find a believer that is capable of explaining the following:

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), for instance, spoke of God as the non aliud: the “not other” or “not something else.” For the Neoplatonist Plotinus (c. 204-270), the divine is that which is no particular thing, or even “no-thing.” The same is true for Christians such as John Scotus Eriugena (c. 815-c. 877) or Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-c. 1327). Angelus Silesius, precisely in order to affirm that God is the omnipotent creator of all things, described God as “ein lauter Nichts”—“a pure nothingness”—and even (a touch of neologistic panache here) “ein Übernichts.” If this all sounds either perilously blasphemous or preciously paradoxical, this is because language of this sort is meant to give us pause, or even offense, in order to remind us as forcefully as possible that, as the great Muslim philosopher Mulla Sadra (c. 1572-1640) insisted, God is not to be found within the realm of beings, for he is the being of all realms. Or, as the Anglican E.L. Mascall put it, God is not “just one item, albeit the supreme one, in a class of beings” but is rather “the source from which their being is derived.33

What is meant by “he is the being of all realms”? This kind of talk strips the notion of god of all its definition and plunges it into the obscure. We can no longer have a discussion or debate if definitions are discarded. It’s difficult enough to have such discourse when there’s disagreement on definitions, so what are we to do in the absence of definitions? This sort of talk is an abuse of language. Theologians of this sort are intentionally obscuring the concept of god so that they have a better chance of preserving it.

Also, this puts the concept on equal footing with Deepak Chopra’s concept of consciousness and Karen Armstrong’s concept of god–which is just as obscure as Hart’s as recently pointed out by Jerry Coyne.34 The reason obscurantist tactics resound with people is because such people are desperate to preserve religious belief and a given concept of god. Both are continuously eroding in societies that are scientifically and technologically advancing. The explanatory power religion once had is increasingly being viewed as inferior to empirical explanations. This leads us to notable arguments.

God of the Gaps Argument

Given the increasing explanatory scope of science, Christians are now turning to an argument that cites the ignorance of science as proof of god’s existence. This argument was popularized by Bill O’Reilly’s meme-worthy statement: “Tide goes in, tide goes out…you can’t explain that.”35 Fortunately, its variants usually focus on the origin of the universe and the origin of life. Christians have argued that since we can’t explain the origin of the universe, god exists; alternatively, they’ve argued that since we can’t explain the origin of life, god exists. Suffice it to say, that if that’s what they’re offering as evidence, “god is an ever-receding pocket of scientific ignorance.”36 The more doors science closes, the less are the gaps he can be shoved into.

Ignoring that there are theories that explain the origin of life and the origin of the universe, what makes this argument bad is that it’s perhaps more obviously fallacious than many of the previous arguments. Since there’s no evidence to the contrary when considering the origin of life and the origin of the universe, god must explain both. If that isn’t enough, they ignore the fallacious nature of the argument and commit another tu quoque: “sure we have god-of-the-gaps, but atheists have science-of-the-gaps.” In other words, they claim that we’re also committing a fallacy when we respond by stating that science will eventually pinpoint the origin(s) of life and the origin of the universe. I would argue that this isn’t the case, but doing so requires me to employ inductive reasoning even if I were to present a deductive argument to that effect. Consider the following:

P1 If the history of science features cases where previously unexplained phenomena were explained, then science will explain contemporary unexplained phenomena.

P2 The history of science features cases where previously unexplained phenomena were explained.

C   Therefore, science will explain contemporary unexplained phenomena.

Though this is a deductive argument, P1 imports inductive reasoning. I argue that we can replace inductive reasoning with abductive reasoning. This discussion, however, is too much of a tangent for our purposes. Suffice it to say there’s nothing fallacious about citing the history of science and on that basis concluding that science will eventually answer modern conundrums.

The Christian Argument From Tradition

Any argument from tradition is fallacious, but in refuting this argument, I’m not at all interested with P1. I’m interested in P2. I want to know whether or not it’s apt to assume that Christianity has been around for a long time. My conclusion is that it hasn’t been around for a long time and that, in fact, it has been long dead.37

The Argument From Desire

This argument is popular among the Tumblr Catholic community though it’s rooted in the following statement by C.S. Lewis: “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.”38 Though popular, the argument is unsound. Furthermore, though it’s as bad as the “Faith in Science” argument, it is offered less frequently as a solid proof of god’s existence. As I summarized, the argument fails because some of us don’t share the desire Lewis speaks of; the Judeo-Christian god is assumed to be the only god concept capable of satisfying said desire; to support the argument, Lewis and others have offered needs (e.g. hunger and thirst) rather than desires; gods are invented solutions rather than actual entities capable of satisfying this desire; there’s the issue of insatiable desire and thus, not all desires warrant satisfaction.39

The Argument From Experience

Subjective experience simply doesn’t prove anything. This argument is frequently used–especially among fundamentalists. I put it under notable arguments because it’s a bad argument. Simple analogy refutes it:

[T]he “feeling” that Christ now speaks to us or lives in our hearts is not such, because people of completely different religions have exactly the same feelings and experiences, only of their gods and spirits and forces, so we know the odds of such feelings and experiences being had even by believers in false religions is 100 percent. Christians experiencing such feelings, too, proves nothing precisely because this is already expected even if their religion is false.40

Conclusion

Sometimes I sympathize with Keith Parsons who states:

I now regard “the case for theism” as a fraud, and I can no longer take it seriously enough to present it to a class as a respectable philosophical position–no more than I could present intelligent design as a legitimate biological theory…I just cannot take their arguments seriously anymore, and if you cannot take something seriously, you should not try to devote academic attention to it.41

Unfortunately, matters are more complicated. While it is true that some Christians are intelligent, others simply aren’t. Some aren’t even aware of how often they display logical fallacies and cognitive biases. Such people will influence other gullible people, and raise and indoctrinate children. Given this, as painstaking as it is, they have to be addressed. In order to promote philosophical and scientific literacy, it is necessary to address them who would work against that goal–them who would distort the facts, or lead people to deny the facts or consider them to be falsehoods. Freedom of speech has led many to regard opinions as sacred. No opinion, whether religious or not, can be immune to criticism and outright derision.

Now, there are arguments that are more specific to Christianity (e.g. the minimal facts argument; the Argument From the Resurrection; the Argument From the Success of Early Christianity). Those aren’t included here because surprisingly, they’re not frequently offered when Christians attempt to demonstrate that Christianity is true. Like the arguments surveyed above, these arguments also fail because they’re based on non-specialist publications geared at a gullible lay audience whose only interest is the verification of their deeply seated beliefs. Many of these people won’t go out of their way to test claims like the following: “there’s more evidence for Jesus than there is for Alexander the Great” or “there’s more evidence for Jesus than there is for Emperor Tiberius.” Both statements are false.[42][43] The same can be said of the pseudo-historical arguments.

Ultimately, the failure of pseudo-historical arguments attempting to prove Jesus’ existence, his resurrection, or some other false historical claim attached to Christianity undermines the entire endeavor of apologetics and thus, guarantees the failure of apologetic arguments. This is precisely the conclusion of my Argument Against Apologetics.44 If Jesus wasn’t the Christ portrayed in the New Testament or if Jesus never existed, Christianity is false; if Christianity is false, then apologetics is pointless. Apologetics is only valuable to them attempting to defend their religion or prove it true. In particular, apologetics is valuable to Christians and Muslims; even then, it is only valuable to small groups within these religions. Even apologetics has it variants (e.g. creationist apologetics: defending against the claims of so called evolutionists).

I have to reiterate, apologetics is a fruitless endeavor. Truth may require explanation and elucidation, but it certainly doesn’t require defense and yet, this is precisely what apologists set out to do. Arguments for god don’t explain or elucidate anything. They merely make assertions and attempt to make them appear intelligible. When scrutinized, as we’ve hopefully gathered by now, these assertions are false and unintelligible.

Works Cited

1 Coyne, Jerry A. “Michael Robbins uses a book review as an excuse to bash atheists—again!”Why Evolution is True. 9 Jul 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

2 Loftus, John W. “Christianity’s Success Was Not Incredible.” The End of Christianity. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2011. 64-65. Print.

3 Ferguson, Matthew. “March to Martyrdom! (Down the Yellow Brick Road…)”Κέλσος. 18 Dec 2012. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

“William Paley: A View of the Evidences of Christianity”William Carey University. 26 Jun 2001. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

Kyle Butt vs Dan Barker ‘Debate’ – The Existence of God (part 1 of 14)”YouTube. YouTube, LLC. 26 Jan 2010. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

6 William Lane Craig and Sean Carroll, “God and Cosmology (33:33)”YouTube. YouTube, LLC. 3 Mar 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

7 Sean Carroll, “God is Not a Good Theory (26:50)”YouTube. YouTube, LLC. 6 Jun 2013. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

8 Victor Stenger, “Is the Universe Fine-Tuned For Us?”University of Colorado. ND. 24 Nov 2014.

9 Byrd, Deborah. “Astoning image of planet-forming disk from ALMA”Earth Sky. 6 Nov 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

10 Sherlock, Michael. “The Atheist Atrocities Fallacy – Hitler, Stalin & Pol Pot”Michael Sherlock Author. 21 Oct 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

11 Saka, Paul. “Pascal’s Wager about God”Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ND. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

12 “Betting on Infinity”Theramin TreesYouTubeYouTube, LLC. 13 Apr 2010. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

13 See “Pascal’s Wager Refuted”

14 Ayer, A.J. “Laws of Nature.” Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Second ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1998. 817-818. Print.

14 Korsgaard, Christine M., and Onora Neill.The Sources of Normativity, p. 36-37. Ca5mbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

16 Ibid. [14]

17 Austin, John, and Wilfrid E. Rumble. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. Print.

18 Dworkin, Ronald. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1986. Print.

19 See “Utilitarian Command Theory”

20 See “The Moral Algorithm”

21 Youpa, Andrew. “Leibniz’s Ethics”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 26 Aug 2004. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

22 Ibid. [6]

23 Ibid. [6]

24 Carroll, Sean. “Post-Debate Reflections”Preposterous Universe. 24 Feb 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

25 Peirce, Charles S. “Design and Chance”, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-1893). Indiana University Press. Bloomington Indiana. 1992. Print.

26 Hume, David. “A Treatise of Human Nature”Online Library of Liberty. 2004-2010. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

27 See “Dispositions, Causality, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument”

28 See “Causation and the Universe: A Response to Edward Feser”

29 See “The Kalam Cosmological Argument and The Problem of Induction”

30 Himma, Kenneth E. “Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence”Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ND. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

31 Oppy, Graham. “Modal Theistic Arguments”Infidels. 1993. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

32 See “The Modal Anti-Ontological Argument”

33 See Hart’s The Experience of God

34 Coyne, Jerry A. “The incoherence of Karen Armstrong”Why Evolution is True. 18 Nov 2014. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

35 “Tide Goes In, Tide Goes Out”YouTubeYouTube, LLC. 17 Feb 2011. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

36 “God of the Gaps & The Frontier of Knowledge – Neil deGrasse Tyson”YouTubeYouTube, LLC. 1 Mar 2011. Web. 24 Nov 2014.

37 See “Refuting the Christian Argument From Tradition”

38 Lewis, C.S. Mere Christianity. Harper. San Francisco, California. 2009. Print.

39 See “Refuting The Argument From Desire”

40 Ibid. [2] (p.69)

41 Keith Parsons as quoted in: Loftus, John W. “Christianity is Wildly Improbable.” The End of Christianity. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2011. 75. Print.

42 Ferguson, Matthew. “Ten Reasons to Reject the Apologetic 10/42 Source Slogan”. Κέλσος. 14 Oct 2012. Web. 25 Nov 2014.

43 Carrier, Richard. On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt, p.21-23. Sheffield, England: Sheffield Phoenix Press Ltd, 2014. Print. Available on web.

44 See “The Argument Against Apologetics”